The gains of ignoring risk: Insurance with better informed principals

Arbeitspapier

We study a competitive insurance market in which insurers have an imperfect informative advantage over policyholders. We show that the presence of insurers privately and heterogeneously informed about risk can explain the concentration levels, the persistent profitability and the pooling of risk observed in some insurance markets. Furthermore, we find that a lower market concentration may entail an increase in insurance premia.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Working Paper ; No. 84

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
• Subject: Insurance markets ; Asymmetric information ; Risk assessment ; Market concentration

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Abrardi, Laura ; Colombo, Luca ; Tedeschi, Piero
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza (DISCE)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2019

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/225056
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET