On the use of menus in sequential common agency

Arbeitspapier

We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1498

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Information and Uncertainty: Other ; Noncooperative Games
• Subject: sequential contracting ; mechanism design ; menus theorems

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Calzolariy, Giacomo ; Pavan, Alessandro
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
• (where): Evanston, IL
• (when): 2008

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59685
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET