Arbeitspapier
Private Information in Sequential Common-Value Auctions
We study an in.nitely-repeated .rst-price auction with common values. Initially, bid-ders receive independent private signals about the objects. value, which itself does not change over time. Learning occurs only through observation of the bids. Under one-sided incomplete information, this information is eventually revealed and the seller extracts es-sentially the entire rent (for large discount factors). Both players.payoþs tend to zero as the discount factor tends to one. However, the uninformed bidder does relatively better than the informed bidder. We discuss the case of two-sided incomplete information, and argue that, under a Markovian re.nement, the outcome is pooling: information is revealed only insofar as it does not aþect prices. Bidders submit a common, low bid in the tradition of .collusion without conspiracy.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1422
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Subject
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repeated game with incomplete information
private information
ratchet effect
first-price auction
dynamic auctions
Auktionstheorie
Asymmetrische Information
Wiederholte Spiele
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Hörner, Johannes
Jamison, Julian
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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2006
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hörner, Johannes
- Jamison, Julian
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 2006
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Common value auctions with return policies
Common value allocation mechanisms with private information: Lotteries or auctions?
Ordinal cheap talk in common value auctions
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions
Secret vs Public Rings in Common Value Auctions
Bayesian inference in structural second-price common value auctions
Limit distributions of equilibrium bids in common value auctions
Sequential Auctions with Generalized Interdependent Values
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Bidding in Common‐Value Auctions With an Unknown Number of Competitors