Arbeitspapier
Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions
We consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization. In this framework, an increase in the reserve price as two effects: it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed. We then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price. This statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations. We then apply the analysis to U.S. offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 977
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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McAfee, R. Preston
Vincent, Daniel
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
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Evanston, IL
- (when)
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1992
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- McAfee, R. Preston
- Vincent, Daniel
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1992
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