Arbeitspapier
Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 2010,119
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
Auctions
Bayesian game
Collusion
Core
Partition form game
Characteristic function
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Forges, Françoise
Orzach, Ram
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Forges, Françoise
- Orzach, Ram
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 2010
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