Arbeitspapier
Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 00-044/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
Auctions
inefficiencies
information disclosure
competition
Auktionstheorie
Informationsökonomik
Wettbewerb
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Goeree, Jacob K.
Offerman, Theo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Goeree, Jacob K.
- Offerman, Theo
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2000
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