Arbeitspapier
Balancing the Bids, Solutions for Unit Price Auctions
Many organizations use procurement tenders to buy large amounts of goods and services. Especially in the public sector the use of these reverse auctions has grown rapidly over the past decades. For the (reverse) unit price auction experience as well as theory have shown that they can attract skewed/unbalanced bids, i.e. bids where the price structure is distorted to take advantage of estimation errors. This paper shows that by either allowing for some secrecy or post tender competition, incentives in unit price auction change in such a way that can make bid skewing disappear.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-047/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Law and Economics: General
Auctions
Public Policy
- Thema
-
unit price auctions
procurement
skewed bids
unbalanced bidding
post tender competition
split award auction
Öffentlicher Auftrag
Auktionstheorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Renes, Sander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Renes, Sander
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Price instability in multi-unit auctions
The Unit Re-balancing Problem
Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: An agent-based Q-learning approach
Balancing Power Auctions - Theoretical and Empirical Analyses
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes
Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
Coordination in Multi-Unit Package Auctions
Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions
Bidding strategies in Austrian and German balancing power auctions
Price instability in multi-unit auctions
The Unit Re-balancing Problem
Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: An agent-based Q-learning approach
Balancing Power Auctions - Theoretical and Empirical Analyses
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes
Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
Coordination in Multi-Unit Package Auctions
Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions
Bidding strategies in Austrian and German balancing power auctions
Price instability in multi-unit auctions
The Unit Re-balancing Problem
Multi-unit multiple bid auctions in balancing markets: An agent-based Q-learning approach
Balancing Power Auctions - Theoretical and Empirical Analyses
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: The GSM spectrum auction in Germany
Low Price Equilibrium in Multi–Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Multiple Unit Auctions and Short Squeezes
Exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
Coordination in Multi-Unit Package Auctions
Pro-Competitive Rationing in Multi-Unit Auctions