Tender Auctions with Existing Operators Bidding

Arbeitspapier

Consider a government tendering a facility, such as an airport or utility, where one bidder owns a competing facility. With a standard auction, this existing operator bids above the auctioned facility's expected profit, as winning means being a monopolist instead of a duopolist. This auction leads to an unregulated outcome which hurts welfare. A consumer-price auction can alleviate this problem. With complementing facilities, the existing operator offers a price below marginal cost and is more likely to win than other bidders; with substitutes, it is less likely to win. Often, the advantaged bidder always wins, eliminating competition for the field.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 13-117/VIII

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; Auctions ; Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; Economics of Regulation
• Thema: Tender auction ; existing operators ; Advantaged bidder ; Price auction ; Auktionstheorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): van den Berg, Vincent A.C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Tinbergen Institute
• (wo): Amsterdam and Rotterdam
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/87459
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ