Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values

Arbeitspapier

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3067

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Noncooperative Games ; Auctions
• Subject: auctions ; Bayesian game ; collusion ; core ; partition function game ; Auktionstheorie ; Koalition ; Bayes-Statistik ; Core ; Kartell ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Biran, Omer ; Forges, Françoise
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2010

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/38961
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET