Arbeitspapier
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative) partition form game. A coalition is core-stable if the core of a suitable characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in which the bidders' final utility possibly depends on the winner's identity. We show that such direct externalities offer a possible explanation for cartels' structures (not) observed in practice.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3067
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Cooperative Games
Noncooperative Games
Auctions
- Thema
-
auctions
Bayesian game
collusion
core
partition function game
Auktionstheorie
Koalition
Bayes-Statistik
Core
Kartell
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Biran, Omer
Forges, Françoise
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Biran, Omer
- Forges, Françoise
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2010
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