Arbeitspapier
A Technical Primer on Auction Theory I: Independent Private Values
This primer rigorously introduces the auction model of "risk neutral bidders with independent private values". The model is central to auction theory, and its structure is the same as a many models used in information economics. Results are derived regarding the nature of equilibria, the effects of entry fess and reserve prices, revenue equilivalence, and the design of optimal auctions. Widely applicable concepts are emphasized, such as revealed preference logic, the single-crossing property, and the Revelation Principle. Intended readers are economics graduate and advanced undergraduate students, and all economists who want to examine auction theory in detail.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1096
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Matthews, Steven A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1995
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Matthews, Steven A.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1995
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Bridge - Primer problema semanal : Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Bridge - (Continuación) : Primer problema semanal - Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Primer drama: a technical education product
Primer drama: a technical education product
Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
The High/Low Divide: Self- Selection by Values in Auction Choice
PrimerROC: accurate condition-independent dimer prediction using ROC analysis
Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values
The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auction and double auctions
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Independent Publishing Based on the Values of Open Science
Auction design and auction outcomes
Bridge - Primer problema semanal : Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Bridge - (Continuación) : Primer problema semanal - Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Primer drama: a technical education product
Primer drama: a technical education product
Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
The High/Low Divide: Self- Selection by Values in Auction Choice
PrimerROC: accurate condition-independent dimer prediction using ROC analysis
Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values
The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auction and double auctions
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Independent Publishing Based on the Values of Open Science
Auction design and auction outcomes
Bridge - Primer problema semanal : Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Bridge - (Continuación) : Primer problema semanal - Explicación del "Auction Bridge"
Primer drama: a technical education product
Primer drama: a technical education product
Double auction with interdependent values: Incentives and efficiency
The High/Low Divide: Self- Selection by Values in Auction Choice
PrimerROC: accurate condition-independent dimer prediction using ROC analysis
Equilibrium in the Two Player, k-Double Auction with Affiliate Private Values
The evolution of bidding behavior in private-values auction and double auctions
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Independent Publishing Based on the Values of Open Science