Learning to set the reserve price optimally in laboratory first price auctions

Artikel

We analyze choices of sellers, each setting a reserve price in a laboratory first price auction with automated equilibrium bidding. Subjects are allowed to gain experience for a fixed period of time prior to making a single payoff-relevant choice. Behavior of more experienced sellers was consistent with benchmark theory: average reserve price for these sellers was independent of the number of bidders and equaled the predicted level. Less experienced sellers however deviated from the theoretical benchmark: on average, they tended to shade reserve price below the predicted level and positively relate it to the number of bidders.

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• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Games ; ISSN: 2073-4336 ; Volume: 9 ; Year: 2018 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1-16 ; Basel: MDPI

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Auctions
• Subject: reserve price ; first-price auction ; experience ; seller learning

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Banerjee, Priyodorshi ; Khare, Shashwat ; Srikant, P.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): MDPI
• (where): Basel
• (when): 2018

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.3390/g9040079
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219200