Arbeitspapier
Third- and higher-price auctions
This paper solves the equilibrium bid functions of third- and higher-price auctions for a large class of distribution functions of bidders' valuations, assuming the symmetric independent private values framework, and risk neutrality. In all these auctions, equilibrium bids exceed bidders' valuations, and bidders raise their bids when one moves to a higher price auction, and lower bids when the number of bidders is increased.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1996,3
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
auctions
procurement
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (wo)
-
Berlin
- (wann)
-
1995
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10075383
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Wolfstetter, Elmar
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Entstanden
- 1995
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