Arbeitspapier
Commitment in first-price auctions
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even to choose the lowest bidder. We compare this setting to a standard first-price auction both theoretically and experimentally. While theory suggests that the offers and the auctioneer's revenue should be higher in a standard first-price auction compared to the first-price auction with renegotiation, we cannot confirm these hypotheses in the experiment.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 19-062
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
- Subject
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Auctions
Experiment
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gillen, Philippe
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (where)
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Mannheim
- (when)
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2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gillen, Philippe
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Time of origin
- 2019
Other Objects (12)
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Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions
A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: Theory and evidence from procurement auctions
Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
Existence of monotone equilibria in first-price auctions with resale
Commitment in first-price auctions
Signaling in First-Price Auctions
Evolutionary stability of first price auctions
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach
Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling
Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions
A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: Theory and evidence from procurement auctions
Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
Existence of monotone equilibria in first-price auctions with resale
Commitment in first-price auctions
Signaling in First-Price Auctions
Evolutionary stability of first price auctions
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling
Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach
Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling
Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions
A pure variation of risk in first-price auctions
Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: Theory and evidence from procurement auctions
Procurement Bidding in First-Price and Second-Price Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests