Arbeitspapier
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
This paper analyzes a procurement setting with two identical firms and stochastic innovations. In contrast to the previous literature, I show that a procurer who cannot charge entry fees may prefer a fixed-prize tournament to a first-price auction since holding an auction may leave higher rents to firms when the innovation technology is subject to large random factors.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SFB 649 Discussion Paper ; No. 2005,041
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
Auctions
National Government Expenditures and Related Policies: Procurement
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
- Subject
-
innovation contest
auction
tournament
quality
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Schöttner, Anja
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2005
- Handle
- Last update
-
24.04.2025, 9:44 PM CEST
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Schöttner, Anja
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk
Time of origin
- 2005
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
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A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments
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Incentives in Tournaments with Endogenous Prize Selection
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
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Essays on Auctions, Tournaments, and Imperfect Competition