Arbeitspapier
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exists, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 250
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- Thema
-
Tournaments
Incentive structures
Rent seeking
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Schweinzer, Paul
Segev, Ella
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
- (wo)
-
München
- (wann)
-
2008
- DOI
-
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13302
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13302-7
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Schweinzer, Paul
- Segev, Ella
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2008
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