- Standort
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- ISSN
-
1573-7187
- Umfang
-
Online-Ressource
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Anmerkungen
-
online resource.
- Erschienen in
-
Small group forecasting using proportional-prize contests ; day:22 ; month:6 ; year:2021 ; pages:1-25
Theory and decision ; (22.6.2021), 1-25
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Urheber
- Beteiligte Personen und Organisationen
-
SpringerLink (Online service)
- DOI
-
10.1007/s11238-021-09825-0
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2021100906532072063386
- Rechteinformation
-
Open Access; Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
15.08.2025, 07:29 MESZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Beteiligte
- Peeters, Ronald
- Rao, Fan
- Wolk, Leonard
- SpringerLink (Online service)
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Optimal prize allocations in group contests
Endogenous prize contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
Differential prize taxation and structural discrimination in contests
Difference-form group contests
Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
Conditional cooperation in group contests
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
Fixed-Prize Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests
Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
Optimal prize allocations in group contests
Endogenous prize contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
Differential prize taxation and structural discrimination in contests
Difference-form group contests
Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
Conditional cooperation in group contests
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
Fixed-Prize Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests
Intra-group heterogeneity in collective contests
Optimal prize allocations in group contests
Endogenous prize contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
Prize sharing in collective contests
The optimal prize structure of symmetric Tullock contests
Differential prize taxation and structural discrimination in contests
Difference-form group contests
Entry regulations and optimal prize allocation in parallel contests
Conditional cooperation in group contests
Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests
Fixed-Prize Tournaments versus First-Price Auctions in Innovation Contests