Arbeitspapier
Commitment in first-price auctions
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even to choose the lowest bidder. We compare this setting to a standard first-price auction both theoretically and experimentally. While theory suggests that the offers and the auctioneer's revenue should be higher in a standard first-price auction compared to the first-price auction with renegotiation, we cannot confirm these hypotheses in the experiment.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ZEW Discussion Papers ; No. 19-062
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Auctions
Market Design
- Thema
-
Auctions
Experiment
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Gillen, Philippe
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
- (wo)
-
Mannheim
- (wann)
-
2019
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Gillen, Philippe
- ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Entstanden
- 2019
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