Least Unmatched Price Auctions: A First Approach

Arbeitspapier

Least-Unmatched Price Auctions have become a popular format of TV and radio shows. Increasingly, they are also applied in internet trading. In these auctions the lowest single (unique) bid wins. We analyze the game-theoretic solution of least unmatched price auctions when prize, bidding cost and the number of participants are known. We use a large data-set of such auctions in order to contrast actual behavior of players with game-theoretic predictions. In the aggregate, bidding behaviour seems to conform with a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 471

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Cooperative Games ; Field Experiments ; Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
• Thema: games ; experiments ; Auktionstheorie ; Glücksspiel ; Spieltheorie ; Test

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eichberger, Jürgen ; Vinogradov, Dmitri
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
• (wo): Heidelberg
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/127294
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ