Arbeitspapier
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
We consider an auction in which k identical objects of unknown value are auctioned off to n bidders. The k highest bidders get an object and pay the k+1st bid. Bidders receive a signal that provides information about the value of the object. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibirum of this auction. We then consider a sequence of auctions Ar with nr bidders and kr objects. We show that price converges in probability to the true value of the object if and only if both kr-->infinity and nr--kr-->infinity, i.e., the number of objects and the number of bidders who do not receive an object in equilibrium go to infinty.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1147
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (where)
-
Evanston, IL
- (when)
-
1995
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
- Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Time of origin
- 1995
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