- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Discussion Paper ; No. 1168
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
- (wo)
-
Evanston, IL
- (wann)
-
1996
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
- Swinkels, Jeroen M.
- Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Entstanden
- 1996
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation
Column aggregation-based pricing combinatorial auctions
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Input Aggregation and Firm Efficiency
Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Fees, incentives, and efficiency in large double auctions
How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation
Column aggregation-based pricing combinatorial auctions
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Input Aggregation and Firm Efficiency
Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Fees, incentives, and efficiency in large double auctions
How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms
Robust Information Aggregation Through Voting
Auctions, actions, and the failure of information aggregation
Column aggregation-based pricing combinatorial auctions
The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions
Input Aggregation and Firm Efficiency
Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
Asymptotic Efficiency for Discriminatory Private Value Auctions
Fees, incentives, and efficiency in large double auctions
How Risk Sharing may enhance Efficiency in English Auctions
Information aggregation in Poisson-elections
Sequential Aggregation of Verifiable Information
Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms