Arbeitspapier
Why are open ascending auctions popular? The role of information aggregation and behavioral biases
The popularity of open ascending auctions is often attributed to the fact that openly observable bidding allows to aggregate dispersed information. Another reason behind the frequent utilization of open auction formats may be that they activate revenue enhancing biases. In an experiment, we compare three auctions that differ in how much information is revealed and in the potential activation of behavioral biases: (i) the ascending Vickrey auction, a closed format; and two open formats, (ii) the Japanese-English auction and (iii) the Oral Outcry auction. Even though bidders react to information conveyed in others’ bids, information aggregation fails in both open formats. In contrast, the Oral Outcry raises higher revenue than the other two formats, by stimulating bidders to submit unprofitable jump bids and triggering a quasi-endowment effect.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. TI 2020-071/I
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Auctions
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
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ascending auctions
information aggregation
jump bidding
auction fever
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Offerman, Theo
Romagnoli, Giorgia
Ziegler, Andreas
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
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Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
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2020
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Offerman, Theo
- Romagnoli, Giorgia
- Ziegler, Andreas
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2020