Arbeitspapier
Non-intrinsic common agency
In this paper we analyse a common agency model in which agents can choose with how many principals they want to work, while principals cannot condition contracts on the agent's decision to accept other contracts. In this case of "non-intrinsic" common agency we characterise the equilibrium. Unless the substitutability between the two outputs is very strong, optimality conditions for principals' contracts are the same as with intrinsic common agency. However, principals suffer from reciprocal competition, which with "moderate" substitutability increases the informational rent agents obtain in equilibrium.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 84.1999
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- Thema
-
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Calzolari, Giacomo
Scarpa, Carlo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
- (wo)
-
Milano
- (wann)
-
1999
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Calzolari, Giacomo
- Scarpa, Carlo
- Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Entstanden
- 1999
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