Arbeitspapier
Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets
This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2004-09
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts
Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- Thema
-
exclusive dealing
common agency
international trade
competition policy
Vertriebsbindung
Handelsvertretung
Oligopol
Internationaler Wettbewerb
Protektionismus
Aussenhandelsliberalisierung
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Raff, Horst
Schmitt, Nicolas
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Kiel University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Kiel
- (wann)
-
2004
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Raff, Horst
- Schmitt, Nicolas
- Kiel University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2004
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