Exclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets

Arbeitspapier

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Economics Working Paper ; No. 2004-09

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation ; Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
• Subject: exclusive dealing ; common agency ; international trade ; competition policy ; Vertriebsbindung ; Handelsvertretung ; Oligopol ; Internationaler Wettbewerb ; Protektionismus ; Aussenhandelsliberalisierung ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Raff, Horst ; Schmitt, Nicolas
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Kiel University, Department of Economics
• (where): Kiel
• (when): 2004

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET