Corruption and optimal regulation under common agency

Artikel

I show that it is optimal to separate non-benevolent regulators when regulated projects are large. Separation prevents regulators from coordinating to appropriate all of the agent's informational rent when they know the type of the latter; therefore, there is a trade-off between saving on informational rent and efficiency, since the game between the regulators induced by separation causes further distortions when compared to the allocation under one regulator. When the informational rent at stake is large due to the size of the project, separation is the optimal institutional answer.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Journal: EconomiA ; ISSN: 1517-7580 ; Volume: 17 ; Year: 2016 ; Issue: 2 ; Pages: 199-209 ; Amsterdam: Elsevier

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
• Thema: Regulation ; Contract theory ; Corruption

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Hemsley, Pedro
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Elsevier
• (wo): Amsterdam
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.1016/j.econ.2016.01.003
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/179621
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:24 MESZ