Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations

Arbeitspapier

We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her information to the worker. We show that information sharing may weaken the worker's incentives and that, consequently, the manager may find it optimal to conceal her information from the worker. Moreover, the manager faces a time-inconsistency problem, which leads her to conceal her information more often than she would if she could commit to an information sharing policy. We build on these results to address issues related to authority in organizations.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Queen's Economics Department Working Paper ; No. 1321

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Firm Behavior: Theory ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Organization of Production
• Thema: Information non-disclosure ; expert evaluation ; agency costs ; authority

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne ; Zabojnik, Jan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Queen's University, Department of Economics
• (wo): Kingston (Ontario)
• (wann): 2013

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/97477
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ