Arbeitspapier

Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium

Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond''s model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 96-12

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Quinzii, Martine
Magill, Michael
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of California, Department of Economics
(where)
Davis, CA
(when)
1996

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Quinzii, Martine
  • Magill, Michael
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 1996

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