Profit Sharing, Credit Market Imperfections and Equilibrium Unemployment

Arbeitspapier

We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining power of banks has adverse employment effects. In a general equilibrium with endogenous outside options this relationship is frequently reversed; reduced credit market imperfections increase equilibrium unemployment if the labour market imperfections – measured by the bargaining power of trade unions - are sufficiently strong and benefit-replacement ratio high enough. Finally, we show that higher bankruptcy risks increase equilibrium unemployment under similar conditions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 1020

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill ; Labor Contracts ; Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
• Thema: wage and loan bargaining ; compensation systems ; equilibrium unemployment ; outside options ; Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit ; Gleichgewicht ; Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung ; Kreditmarkt ; Unvollkommener Markt ; Lohnverhandlungstheorie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Koskela, Erkki ; Stenbacka, Rune
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2004

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/20255
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ