Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Unemployment Under Negotiated Profit Sharing

We study employment, employee effort, wages and profit sharing when firms face stochastic revenue shocks and when base wages and profit shares are determined through negotiations. The negotiated profit share depends positively on the relative bargaining power of the trade union and it has effort-enhancing and wage-moderating effects. We show that higher profit sharing reduces equilibrium unemployment under circumstances with sufficiently ?rigid? labour market institutions, i.e. sufficiently high benefit-replacement ratios and relative bargaining powers of trade unions. Conversely, profit sharing seems to be destructive from the point of view of employment when the labour market ?rigidities? are sufficiently small.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 840

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Labor Contracts
Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
Thema
bargaining
profit sharing
efficiency wages
equilibrium unemployment
Tarifliche Gewinnbeteiligung
Lohnverhandlungstheorie
Effizienzlohn
Theorie der Arbeitslosigkeit
Arbeitsmarktflexibilisierung
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Koskela, Erkki
Stenbacka, Rune
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2003

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Koskela, Erkki
  • Stenbacka, Rune
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2003

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