Arbeitspapier
Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium
Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond''s model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 96-12
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Quinzii, Martine
Magill, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of California, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Davis, CA
- (wann)
-
1996
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Quinzii, Martine
- Magill, Michael
- University of California, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 1996