Arbeitspapier

Incentives and Risk Sharing in a Stock Market Equilibrium

Economists hold two opposing views of the stock market: one focuses on the negative effect on incentives of separating ownership and control, the other emphasizes its beneficial role for risk sharing. Using a generalization of Diamond''s model which incorporates the effect of entrepreneurial incentives, we show how these two views can be reconciled. We introduce the concept of a stock market equilibrium with rational competitive price perceptions (RCPP) and show that such and equilibrium leads to a constrained optimal trade-off between risk sharing and incentives. We give examples showing the difference between RCPP equilibria and the standard CAPM type equilibria of finance.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 96-12

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Quinzii, Martine
Magill, Michael
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
1996

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Quinzii, Martine
  • Magill, Michael
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 1996

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