Arbeitspapier
Incentives and welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information
This paper studies the incentives and the welfare effect of sharing firm-specific information in asymmetric Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly with mixed substitute and complement goods. Revealing firm-specific cost information is the dominant strategy in Cournot oligopoly, while concealing is so in Bertrand oligopoly. Such information sharing always hurts consumers. It increases social welfare in quantity competition and reduces social welfare in price competition. The results of sharing firm-specific cost information in Cournot oligopoly also apply to sharing firm-specific demand information in Cournot and Bertrand competition.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. FS IV 97-48
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Jin, Jim Y.
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
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1997
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Jin, Jim Y.
- Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Time of origin
- 1997
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