Arbeitspapier

Farkas' lemma and complete indifference

In a finite two player game consider the matrix of one player's payoff difference between any two consecutive pure strategies. Define the half space induced by a column vector of this matrix as the set of vectors that form an obtuse angle with this column vector. We use Farkas' lemma to show that this player can be made indifferent between all pure strategies if and only if the union of all these half spaces covers the whole vector space. This result leads to a necessary (and almost sufficient) condition for a game to have a completely mixed Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate its usefulness by providing the class of all symmetric two player three strategy games that have a unique and completely mixed symmetric Nash equilibrium.

ISBN
978-3-949224-12-6
Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: BERG Working Paper Series ; No. 191

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Subject
completely mixed strategies
mixed Nash equilibria
Farkas’
lemma

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Herold, Florian
Kuzmics, Christoph
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)
(where)
Bamberg
(when)
2024

Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Herold, Florian
  • Kuzmics, Christoph
  • Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group (BERG)

Time of origin

  • 2024

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