Arbeitspapier

Pairwise partition graphs and strategy-proof social choice in the exogenous indifference class model

In this paper we consider the exogenous indifference classes model of Barberá and Ehlers (2011) and Sato (2009) and analyze further the relationship between the structure of indifference classes across agents and dictatorship results. The key to our approach is the pairwise partition graph. We provide necessary conditions on these graphs for strategy-proofness and unanimity (or efficiency) to imply dictatorship. These conditions are not sufficient; we also provide separate stronger conditions that are sufficient. A full characterization is obtained in the case of two agents for domains where strategy-proofness and efficiency imply dictatorship.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: ISER Discussion Paper ; No. 898

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Thema
Social choice functions
Strategy-proofness
Dictatorial Domains
Exogenous Indifference Class
Gibbard- Satterthwaite theorem

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Pramanik, Anup
Sen, Arunava
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)
(wo)
Osaka
(wann)
2014

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Pramanik, Anup
  • Sen, Arunava
  • Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER)

Entstanden

  • 2014

Ähnliche Objekte (12)