Arbeitspapier
Risk-taking tournaments: theory and experimental evidence
We study risk-taking behavior in a simple two person tournament in a theoretical model as well as a laboratory experiment. First, a model is analyzed in which two agents simultaneously decide between a risky and a safe strategy and we allow for all possible degrees of correlation between the outcomes of the risky strategies. We show that risk-taking behavior crucially depends on this correlation as well as on the size of a potential lead of one of the contestants. We find that the experimental subjects acted mostly quite well in line with the derived theoretical predictions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 3400
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Personnel Economics: Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
- Thema
-
Tournaments
competition
risk-taking
experiment
Extensives Spiel
Arbeitskräfte
Risikopräferenz
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nieken, Petra
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-2008031840
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nieken, Petra
- Sliwka, Dirk
- Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Entstanden
- 2008
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