Arbeitspapier
Risk Taking in Asymmetric Tournaments
In an asymmetric tournament model with endogenous risk choice by the agents it is shown that equilibrium efforts decrease (increase) with risk if abilities are sufficiently similar (different). Risk also affects winning probabilities. The interaction of both effects is analyzed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 33/2001
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- Thema
-
effort effect
likelihood effect
risk taking
tournament
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kräkel, Matthias
Sliwka, Dirk
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kräkel, Matthias
- Sliwka, Dirk
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2001