Arbeitspapier
Endogenous cartel formation: Experimental evidence
In a Bertrand-oligopoly experiment, firms choose whether or not to engage in cartel-like communication and, if so, they may get fined by a cartel authority. We find that four-firm industries form cartels more often than duopolies because they gain less from a hysteresis effect after cartel disruption.
- ISBN
-
978-3-86304-158-8
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 159
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- Thema
-
cartels
collusion
communication
experiments
repeated games
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Fonseca, Miguel A.
Normann, Hans-Theo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
- (wo)
-
Düsseldorf
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Fonseca, Miguel A.
- Normann, Hans-Theo
- Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)
Entstanden
- 2014
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