Arbeitspapier
On equilibrium refinement in supermodular games
We show that supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess a pure strategy perfect equilibrium and a strategically stable set of pure strategies. We illustrate that, in continuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may contain weakly dominated actions. Moreover, in discontinuous supermodular games, perfect equilibria may involve play of actions in the interior of the set of weakly dominated actions. We prove that when the set of undominated actions is a sublattice, supermodular games satisfying sequential better-reply security possess pure strategy perfect equilibria that can be obtained as limits of undominated actions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2012-07
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
supermodular game
weakly dominated strategy
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
strategically stable set
supermodular game
weakly dominated strategy
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
strategically stable set
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
McLean, Richard P.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Rutgers University, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
New Brunswick, NJ
- (wann)
-
2012
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol
- McLean, Richard P.
- Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2012
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