Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games

Arbeitspapier

In this paper, we propose a definition of Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium (HTE) for general signaling games with non-Bayesian players nested by an updating rule according to Hypothesis Testing model characterized by Ortoleva (2012). An HTE may be different from a sequential Nash equilibrium because of the dynamic inconsistency. However, when player 2 only takes zero-probability message as an unexpected news, an HTE is a refinement of sequential Nash equilibrium and it survives Intuitive Criterion, but not vice versa. We provide existence theorem covering a broad class of signaling games often studied in economics, and the constrained HTE is unique in such signaling games.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers ; No. 557

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft
• Thema: Signaling Games ; Hypothesis Testing Equilibrium ; Equilibrium Refinement

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Sun, Lan
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW)
• (wo): Bielefeld
• (wann): 2016

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/149014
• URN: urn:nbn:de:0070-pub-29035369
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 20.09.2024, 08:25 MESZ