Arbeitspapier

Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games

We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria (as the players become infinitely patient) need not be unique.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 14/196

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Thema
Strategic Bargaining
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Stationary Strategies
Nash Bargaining Solution
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Vollkommene Information
Verhandlungstheorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Britz, Volker
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Predtetchinski, Arkadi
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2014

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010147817
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Britz, Volker
  • Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
  • Predtetchinski, Arkadi
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2014

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