Arbeitspapier
Equilibrium Delay and Non-existence of Equilibrium in Unanimity Bargaining Games
We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by the current state and the identity of the player who rejected the current proposal. This protocol encompasses a vast number of special cases studied in the literature. We show that subgame perfect equilibria in pure stationary strategies need not exist. When such equilibria do exist, they may exhibit delay. Limit equilibria (as the players become infinitely patient) need not be unique.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 14/196
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
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Strategic Bargaining
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
Stationary Strategies
Nash Bargaining Solution
Nash-Gleichgewicht
Vollkommene Information
Verhandlungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Britz, Volker
Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
- (wo)
-
Zurich
- (wann)
-
2014
- DOI
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doi:10.3929/ethz-a-010147817
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Britz, Volker
- Herings, P. Jean-Jacques
- Predtetchinski, Arkadi
- ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
Entstanden
- 2014