Arbeitspapier
Game-theoretic foundations of monetary equilibrium
Monetary theorists have advanced an intriguing notion: we exchange money to make up for a lack of enforcement, when it is difficult to monitor and sanction opportunistic behaviors. We demonstrate that, in fact, monetary equilibrium cannot generally be sustained when monitoring and punishment limitations preclude enforcement - external or not. Simply put, monetary systems cannot operate independently of institutions - formal or informal - designed to monitor behaviors and sanction undesirable ones. This fundamental result is derived by integrating monetary theory with the theory of repeated games, studying monetary equilibrium as the outcome of a matching game with private monitoring.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: SAFE Working Paper ; No. 32
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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Social norms
repeated games
cooperation
payment systems
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Camera, Gabriele
Gioffré, Alessandro
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
- (where)
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Frankfurt a. M.
- (when)
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2013
- DOI
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doi:10.2139/ssrn.2334192
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:hebis:30:3-317888
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Camera, Gabriele
- Gioffré, Alessandro
- Goethe University Frankfurt, SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe
Time of origin
- 2013