Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach

Arbeitspapier

The paper explores a game-theoreticmodel of petty corruption involving a sequence of entrepreneurs and a track of bureaucrats. Each entrepreneur's project is approved if and only if it is cleared by each bureaucrat. The project value is stochastic; its value is observed only by the entrepreneur, but its distribution is commonknowledge. Each bureaucrat clears the project only if a bribe is paid. The bribe for qualified projects (extortion) and unqualified projects (capture) may differ. We identify the nature and welfare implications of different types of equilibria under appropriate technical assumptions on the structure of the game.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CAE Working Paper ; No. 08-09

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games ; Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development ; Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
• Thema: corruption ; repeated games ; hold up ; extortion ; capture ; Korruption ; Wiederholte Spiele ; Bürokratie ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane ; Majumdar, Mukul ; Radner, Roy
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Cornell University, Center for Analytical Economics (CAE)
• (wo): Ithaca, NY
• (wann): 2008

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/70435
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ