Arbeitspapier

Platform Liability and Innovation

We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovative products. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare when the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9984

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Thema
platform
liability
intellectual property
innovation

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Jeon, Doh-Shin
Lefouili, Yassine
Madio, Leonardo
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Jeon, Doh-Shin
  • Lefouili, Yassine
  • Madio, Leonardo
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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