Arbeitspapier
Platform Liability and Innovation
We study a platformâs incentives to delist IP-infringing products and the effects of holding the platform liable for the presence of such products on innovation and consumer welfare. For a given number of buyers, platform liability increases innovation by reducing the competitive pressure faced by innovative products. However, there can be a misalignment of interests between innovators and buyers. Furthermore, platform liability can have unintended consequences, which overturn the intended effect on innovation. Platform liability tends to increase (decrease) innovation and consumer welfare when the elasticity of participation of innovators is high (low) and that of buyers is low (high).
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9984
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- Thema
-
platform
liability
intellectual property
innovation
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Jeon, Doh-Shin
Lefouili, Yassine
Madio, Leonardo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2022
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Jeon, Doh-Shin
- Lefouili, Yassine
- Madio, Leonardo
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2022