Bonus Pools, Limited Liability, and Tournaments

Arbeitspapier

Tournaments have been objected as resulting from ad hoc restrictions to the contracting problem which are not easily justified. Taking into account that a performance measure might not be verifiable to a third party, however, a restriction to payments which sum up to a constant may be reasonable. The paper analyzes such fixed payment schemes with regard to their optimality and the relation to the special case of tournaments. It emerges that for a group of identical risk-neutral agents, the optimal fixed payment scheme is a tournament.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 205

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design ; Personnel Economics: Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects ; Personnel Economics: Labor Management
• Thema: bonus pools ; relative performance evaluation ; subjective performance evaluation ; tournaments ; verifiability

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Budde, Jörg
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
• (wo): München
• (wann): 2007

Weitere Informationen

• DOI: doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.13347
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93955
• URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-13347-6
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ