Arbeitspapier
Dynamic Bonus Pools
We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and nonverifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features memory. If the agent succeeds in the first-period, second-period incentives are weakened whereas higher-powered incentives are provided if he fails. The two-period bonus pool offers a complementary reason for why third-party payments are not commonly observed in practice.
- Sprache
- 
                Englisch
 
- Erschienen in
- 
                Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 443
 
- Klassifikation
- 
                Wirtschaft
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Geistige Schöpfung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Budde, Jörg
 Hofmann, Christian
 
- Ereignis
- 
                Veröffentlichung
 
- (wer)
- 
                Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
 
- (wo)
- 
                München
 
- (wann)
- 
                2011
 
- DOI
- 
                
                    
                        doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17406
- Handle
- URN
- 
                
                    
                        urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17406-5
- Letzte Aktualisierung
- 
                
                    
                        10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Budde, Jörg
- Hofmann, Christian
- Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Entstanden
- 2011
