Arbeitspapier

Dynamic Bonus Pools

We analyze a two-period agency problem with limited liability and nonverifiable information. The principal commits to a dynamic bonus pool comprising a fixed total payment that may be distributed over time to the agent and a third party. We find that the optimal two-period contract features memory. If the agent succeeds in the first-period, second-period incentives are weakened whereas higher-powered incentives are provided if he fails. The two-period bonus pool offers a complementary reason for why third-party payments are not commonly observed in practice.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; No. 443

Classification
Wirtschaft

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Budde, Jörg
Hofmann, Christian
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
(where)
München
(when)
2011

DOI
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.17406
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-17406-5
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Budde, Jörg
  • Hofmann, Christian
  • Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)

Time of origin

  • 2011

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