Arbeitspapier
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
Several empirical findings have challenged the traditional view on the trade-off between risk and incentives. By combining risk aversion and limited liability in a standard principal-agent model the empiri- cal puzzle on the positive relationship between risk and incentives can be explained. Increasing risk leads to a less informative performance signal. Under limited liability; the principal may optimally react by in- creasing the weight on the signal and; hence; choosing higher-powered incentives.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 6/2008
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Economics of Contract: Theory
- Thema
-
moral hazard
limited liability
risk-incentive relationship
Moral Hazard
Beschränkte Haftung
Leistungsanreiz
Risikoaversion
Agency Theory
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Budde, Jörg
Kräkel, Matthias
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
- (wo)
-
Bonn
- (wann)
-
2008
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Budde, Jörg
- Kräkel, Matthias
- University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
Entstanden
- 2008
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