Arbeitspapier
The Economics of Platform Liability
Public authorities in many jurisdictions are concerned about the proliferation of illegal content and products on online platforms. In this paper, we provide an economic appraisal of platform liability that highlights the effects of a stricter liability rule on several key variables such as prices, terms and conditions, business models, and investments. We also discuss the impact of the liability regime applying to online platforms on competition between them and the incentives of third parties relying on them. Finally, we analyze the potential costs and benefits of measures that have received much attention in recent policy discussions.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 8919
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior: General
Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
Firm Organization and Market Structure
Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
- Thema
-
liabilities rules
online platforms
illegal content and products
intellectual property
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lefouili, Yassine
Madio, Leonardo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2021
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lefouili, Yassine
- Madio, Leonardo
- Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2021
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Platform Liability and Innovation
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Liability games
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Limiting Limited Liability
The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?
Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
The allocation of authority under limited liability
On the Shapley value of liability games
Platform Liability and Innovation
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Liability games
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Limiting Limited Liability
The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?
Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
The allocation of authority under limited liability
On the Shapley value of liability games
Platform Liability and Innovation
The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition
The economics of credence goods: on the role of liability, verifiability, reputation and competition
Liability games
Switching consumers and product liability: on the optimality of incomplete strict liability
Limiting Limited Liability
The design of liability rules for highly risky activities: Is strict liability the better solution?
Vicarious Liability and the Intensity Principle
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
Limited Liability and the Risk-Incentive Relationship
The allocation of authority under limited liability