Arbeitspapier
Costs of Control in Groups
This paper explores the role of social groups in explaining the reaction to control.We propose a simple model with a principal using control devices and a controlledagent, which incorporates the existence of social groups. Testing experimentally theconjectures derived from the model and related literature, we find that agents in socialgroups (i) perform more than other (no-group) agents; (ii) expect less control thanno-group agents; (iii) decrease their performance substantially when actual controlexceeds their expectation, while no-group agents do not react; (iv) do not reciprocatewhen facing less control than expected, while no-group agents do.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: ifo Working Paper ; No. 113
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior
Personnel Economics: Labor Management
- Thema
-
Personalkontrolle
Soziale Gruppe
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Persönlichkeitspsychologie
Leistungsmotivation
Test
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Riener, Gerhard
Wiederhold, Simon
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Riener, Gerhard
- Wiederhold, Simon
- ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich
Entstanden
- 2011