Arbeitspapier
Intention-based reciprocity and the hidden costs of control
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differ in their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3553
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Subject
-
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
crowding-out
intention-based reciprocity
incomplete information
hidden costs of control
Leistungsmotivation
Leistungsbeurteilung
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Crowding out
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Siemens, Ferdinand von
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2011
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Siemens, Ferdinand von
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2011
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