Arbeitspapier
Intention-Based Reciprocity and the Hidden Costs of Control
Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting controlcan reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows thatintention-based reciprocity can cause such motivational crowding-out if individuals differin their propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not beingcontrolled might then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates notbeing controlled with high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoreticalwisdom on motivational crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-115/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Relation of Economics to Social Values
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior: General
- Thema
-
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation
crowding-out
intention-based reciprocity
Leistungsmotivation
Leistungsbeurteilung
Austauschtheorie (Soziologie)
Verdrängungseffekt
Asymmetrische Information
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- von Siemens, Ferdinand
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011
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